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ON ABSOLUTISMS IN LEGAL THOUGHT*
MORRIS

R. COHENt

In the reaction against mechanical jurisprudence, against the complacent
manipulation of legal concepts in utter disregard of the facts of social life, it
is well to be on guard against throwing out the baby with the bath. Granted
that traditional concepts like rights, titles, contracts, etc., have been grossly
abused, it ought still to be clear that without the use of concepts and general
principles we can have no science, or intelligible systematic account, of the
law or of any other field. And the demand for system in the law is urgent
not only on theoretical but also on practical grounds. Without general ideas,
human experience is dumb as well as blind.
It is important also in any intellectual enterprise to remember that there
must always be a certain difference between theory and practice or experience.
A theory must certainly be simpler than the factual complexity or chaos that
faces us when we lack the guidance which a general chart of the field affords
us. A chart or map would be altogether useless if it did not simplify the
actual contours and topography which it describes. In advanced physical
science all concepts and laws refer to ideal conditions which can never be
completely realized. Thus the law of the lever tells us what would happen
if we had an absolutely rigid body in the form of a purely geometric line, and
the law of falling bodies states what would happen in a perfect vacuum.
Neither of these conditions is perfectly attainable on earth. Similarly, it is
not necessary that the principles or theoretic assumptions of legal science
shall be found to be fully realized. No science offers us an absolutely complete account of its subject matter. It is sufficient if it indicates some general
*The subject matter of this article formed the substance of an address delivered before
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pattern to which the phenomena approximate more or less. For practical
purposes any degree of approximation will do if it will lead to a greater
control over nature than we should have without our ideal pattern. But for
theoretic purposes we need the postulate that all divergences between the ideal
and the actual will be progressively minimized by the discovery of subsidiary
principles deduced from, or at any rate consistent with, the principles of our
science.
From the foregoing there follows the necessity of two opposed attitudes.
In the first place we must not forget that our fundamental principles are after
all only assumptions; and that to persist in them despite factual evidence to
the contrary may be foolhardy or Quixotic. On the other hand we must have
faith, courage, and persistence in our first principles. When the facts of
experience seem to be in opposition we must not forget that what are generally regarded as facts may be only the blind assumptions of unreflective
experience, and that the progress of science generally consists in showing
that our theory can give a new and more adequate interpretation of the
so-called facts. The Copernican astronomy naturally comes to our mind as
an example of a theory that succeeds even though it seems at first to go
counter to the universally observed fact of the motion of the sun around the
earth. Our generation has also seen a remarkable instance of this in the way
in which Einstein's theory of relativity has made its way despite what seemed
to be established fact. The man who abandons a theory at the first difficulty
which it encounters will never achieve anything in science. For in science as
in everything else achievement depends upon the persistence which overcomes
obstacles.
These reflections suggest a certain caution in attempting to refute legal
theories on the ground that they do not seem to be in agreement with fact.
These theories may have enough vitality to overcome the difficulties which
seem to us fatal. It is, however, always relevant and useful to point out that
such a theory is inadequate, that it leaves out certain necessary considerations.
This is a relatively easy (though necessary) task because incompleteness is
an inevitable characteristic of theory as well as of factual knowledge generally. What has been called absolutism in the intellectual realm is the
confidence in our intellectual constructions which makes us refuse to consider
the further qualifications necessary to make our general proposition true.
This seems to be unavoidable. The process of qualification is laborious and
seemingly endless. Practical needs and our vital and psychic economy
demand absolute (i. e., unqualified) answers, and make us cling to what
sounds or seems to us simple. From this tendency it would hardly be possible to escape if it were not that diverse needs breed cravings for differing
and opposing absolutisms. In confronting such opposites with each other we
come to see the need of more adequate formulations.
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To illustrate this need is the task to which the following pages are
devoted. While the outer form of my exposition will thus be almost entirely
critical, its substance will, I hope, be found to be eirenic. I wish to follow
the good scholastic method of Gratian's Decretum as well as Abelard's Sic
et non, of trying to save the truth in opposing views by drawing the proper
distinction which enables us to harmonize them.
I. LOGICAL PHASE OF LEGAL ABSOLUTISM

Absolutism in Definition
Let us begin by considering the vices of legal absolutism from the point
of view of logic. The first manifestation of absolutism that suggests itself
is the complacent assumption that there can be only one true or correct
definition of any object. This assumption underlies the traditional controversies as to the nature of law and Kant's 1 famous reproach to jurists on this
score. Yet on consulting any scholarly dictionary we can readily see that
few words in common use have only one meaning. This should warn us that
in controversies as to the proper definition of a term, the contestants, while
using the same word (definiendum) may be really concerned with different
things (definiens). Consider, for instance, Maine's 'a criticism of Austin's 2
definition of law as an imperative or command of the sovereign. In substance
Maine's objection is that there are communities in which there is no one who
habitually issues commands that are generally obeyed, and yet conduct in
them is governed by some law. Now the word law is, doubtless, used to
denote the customs according to which the members of certain primitive
communities generally conduct their lives. But this is no objection at all to
Austin's analysis of the law found in classical Rome and in modern civilized
states. In the latter we certainly do find law-making bodies which abrogate
certain customs, such as rebating or over-certification, and create new ones,
such as those connected with income tax returns. It is not necessary for my
present purpose to defend the complete adequacy of Austin's theory, but
merely to note that Maine does not really refute the given definition when
he shows that the word law is also used in another sense than that employed
by Austin. ;Of course, the objects of these two senses are connected, and one
may well contend that law in Austin's sense could not exist without law in
Maine's sense, that is, that there could be no sovereign whose orders are generally obeyed unless there were certain more general customs actually prevailing, so that the phenomenon to which Austin refers is thus sociologically
derivative and not primary. But while this statement may be true, those who
make it are generally guilty of the genetic fallacy of the identification of a
thing with its cause or condition. Law may be derived from custom but is
I.
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obviously not identical with it. The law which is studied in our law schools,
administered in our courts and about which men consult lawyers or agitate
in the political forum for legislative changes is not the same as custom. The
late Mr. Carter, who identified law and custom, 3 had the courage of his confusion and argued that judges are experts in the customs of the various
subjects on which they have to rule. But no one else has taken that consequence of the theory seriously. Yet, the failure to distinguish clearly between4
law and custom underlies all the assumptions of Ehrlich's Living Law.
There are obviously many practices which actually prevail but are not recognized or enforced by the legal machinery, e. g., the practice of tipping waiters;
and there are, on the other hand, laws regulating acts which are in no significant sense customary, e. g., the rules governing testamentary dispositions or
equitable conversion. Indeed legal prescriptions through legislation are necessary precisely because custom proves inadequate to regulate our social
relations satisfactorily.
Following Ehrlich, my friend Professor Llewellyn has argued with
great force that court litigation represents only the pathology of law, the
divergence from the normal practice. The converse of that proposition, however, cannot well be denied. Modern business practice is undoubtedly
moulded by past and expected court litigation, by legislative enactments and
by administrative orders. That is what gives point to political struggles to
control the organs of government.
Law as custom and law through deliberate legislation are thus both realities and we cannot by an arbitrary definition disprove the existence of one
or of the other. The important thing is rather to unravel their actual interrelations, and that cannot be done by a mere definition.
It may seem rather trite, but it is important to insist that while there is
an arbitrary element in all definitions, the question of their truth or correctness cannot be altogether dismissed. If we ignore the facts of actual historic
usage, a definition is a resolution to use a word as a sign or symbol for a
certain object and involves no necessary assumption that the object exists
in nature. If we do not like a word in common use we can always invent a
new one to denote the particular object we have in mind. In organizing a
theoretic system such as geometry we are also free to choose our indefinables
and our definitions will then vary according to this choice. We cannot, however, safely ignore the question of consistency in our use of words and this
involves (i) attention to the meanings which our words in fact actually convey to our public and to ourselves and (2) the fact that definitions must
serve a definite function in any scientific system.
3. CA TER, LAw: ITs
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(i) There can be no doubt that departures from general usage do lead
to inconsistencies and confusion. For common usage is a habit and the resolution to use a word in a new sense is, like any other resolution, more easily
made than kept. In point of fact, therefore, whenever we define a word like
law, crime, marriage, person, or the like in a manner that departs from current customary usage, we sooner or later unwittingly fall back on the common
use and thus confuse the meaning of our terms. Regard, therefore, for common usage is a counsel of prudence or practical wisdom.
Unfortunately, however, common usage reflects common modes of
thought which are generally vague and unprecise and often grossly inconsistent. Thus we commonly speak of legislatures passing laws and at other
times assert that such a law when not enforced is not a law at all. Obviously
this is, when taken literally, nonsense; and we can extricate ourselves from
such positions either by making a sharp distinction between statutes and laws
or by defining law independently of enforcement. In this way we are led to
technical definitions which depart from common usage by introducing more
precise limitations or distinctions.
(2) Definitions, while not absolutely necessary in pure mathematics, are
practically indispensable in all sciences or responsible discourse. They can
help us to grasp more clearly the fundamental ideas or patterns in any field
of study and thus serve to create a definite point of view or perspective for
the organization of our subject matter. In this respect some definitions are
certainly more helpful than others.
From this point of view we must condemn all definitions of law (or of
parts of it, e. g., the criminal law) as that which is right, just, expresses the
will of the majority, safeguards the social welfare or security, etc. For the
historic complaints so bitterly and persistently made against the law raise
issues of fact which cannot be properly disposed of by a mere definition.
When any one says that an unjust law is not a law, that a legislative enactment is not a law unless it is the will of the majority, or that a provision of
the criminal code is not a law if it does not in fact promote the safety of the
community, he is resorting to a violent use of words to escape the problem
of considering the factual elements in the case.
The law about which we shall be concerned in what follows is that with
which judges, lawyers and law schools are concerned, i. e., with rules of conduct determinable by courts. That is what we commonly have in mind when
we speak of the law of bankruptcy, divorce, etc., in any state; and our discussion of what is involved in a definition of law is thus only an illustration
or paradigm of what is involved in the definition of any legal institution of
property, contract, and the like, on which actual decisions depend.
Absolute Divisions
The craving for greater simplicity and definiteness than our material
naturally offers shows itself also in the desire for clear-cut absolute divisions.
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Now the simplest mode of division is that into two mutually exclusive parts
such as we have when a line divides a surface into two mutually exclusive
areas. This type of division (dichotomy) is especially prominent in the law
where the aim is to narrow every issue down to a yes-or-no answer. Let me
refer to one of these divisions to illustrate my general thesis, namely, that
between criminal and civil law.
As regards substance and as regards procedure the civil and the criminal
law overlap so that it is impossible to say with absolute precision where one
begins and the other ends. As to substance, few today will venture to assert
that all criminal acts involve greater moral turpitude than the frauds and
other acts which constitute torts. Nor can we maintain the old view that the
criminal law deals with acts which endanger the common welfare while the
civil law deals with what is of interest only to private individuals. The
general social interest in the maintenance of proper family relations, of
proper industrial relations and the like, is certainly as great as that involved
in the protection offered by large parts of the criminal law against various
misdemeanors. Indeed, are not the same interests often protected in both
ways, and are there not many acts which are both civil and criminal wrongs?
As to the difference of procedure, it is easy enough to call certain procedures
criminal and others civil, but not easy to define the difference. The layman
who generally thinks of crimes as serious felonies like murder and robbery,
naturally says that criminal prosecutions are brought by officers of the state
who are in duty bound to do so, whereas a private action is brought by arg
individual at his option. But leaving aside the classic common-law forms of
private prosecution for criminal offenses and the fact that in England the
Attorney General can still prosecute certain cases of tort, we still face the fact
that an action for the collection of land tax, or other obligation to the government, may take the form of a civil suit. Despite all sorts of theoretical differences, such as the different degrees of evidence required, such civil actions
do not in effect differ very much from prosecutions to enforce penalties for
certain misdemeanors. Nor can the sentence which results from criminal
procedure be always sharply distinguished from the judgment in a civil
action. To be sure, no civil action any longer terminates in death or imprisonment as the old Roman and Teutonic law often did. Yet even today,
imprisonment for certain kinds of debts, for non-payment of alimony, and
for contempt of court often grows out of civil procedure. Nor are the fines
of the criminal law necessarily more severe than the civil damages that are
frankly recognized as punitive. Consider, for instance, the triple damages
paid by the Danbury union hatters under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law., In
some cases this meant the loss of home and all of a life's savings. Can we
doubt that this was a punishment more severe than that for many misde5. Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 523 (1915).
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meanors? Men sometimes prefer to go to jail rather than pay certain fines,
and the appointment of receivers to take charge of one's business is sometimes regarded as even worse.
These doubts cannot of course wipe out the direct and indirect differences between criminal and civil actions; but the point I am making is that
the existence of such differences, like the existence of the varieties of a
species, does not necessarily establish a rigid dichotomous division. Similar
considerations hold in regard to the dichotomous divisions between public and
private law, between substantive and procedural law, between judicial and
administrative law.
We may carry over this distrust of dichotomous division to the distinction between what is and what is not law. Looking at the matter externally
after the courts have decided, we can say what is and what is not the law in
the given case. But can we be so certain as to the cases not yet decided? The
actual element of uncertainty as to what the courts will rule cannot be denied.
Some English statutes have become part of our common law, while others
have been rejected as inapplicable to American conditions. Have all such
issues been decided? There are many obsolescent statutes concerning which
there is no evidence or little evidence as to whether the courts will hold them
applicable to modern conditions. There are other situations where doubt
exists because there is no way of bringing the issue before any tribunal competent to settle it. What is the status of the clause in the Constitution directing Congress to apportion representation according to the latest census? 6 Is
it law or is it a prescription of political morality, like the duty or custom of
a British Cabinet to resign after an adverse vote in the House of Commons?
Again where are we to draw the line between a law and administrative order;
e. g., is a post office regulation a law?
The foregoing and similar doubts indicate that while theoretically we
can and must define the law or branches of it in certain ways and draw
logical conclusions from them, the actual situation is not as simple and as
clear-cut as our dichotomous divisions make it appear.
On Self-Evident Principles
Though the majority of our lawyers deny the relevance or necessity of
any theory, it is not difficult to see that their view of the law involves a set
of absolutes. The principal one of these absolute assumptions is that the law
is a closed or complete system of rules, so that no matter what case comes up
from the hurly-burly of life, an answer can be deduced with absolute certainty from the principles embodied in statutes or in previously decided cases.
This view, however, obviously ignores the fact that the law is not at any one
time completed but is always being modified in the process of judicial decision. Not only is the common law what the judges have made it but this is
6. U. S. CoxsT., Art. I, § 2.
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also largely the case with our statutory law, of which constitutional law is a
special instance. Gray seems to me to have shown this in an historically
irrefutable way.7 Against this it has been urged that if there is no law before
the judge decides, the action of people and even of the judge is lawless; and
this our critics regard as a reductio ad absurdum. This argument is, however, itself an illustration of logically vicious absolutism. It assumes that
there either must be a complete law for every decision or else there is no law
at all. But why not admit the fact that while judges are bound more or less
by previous decisions, by general opinions, and by all the factors that Gray
calls "sources of law", they also have after all the sovereign power of choice,
and that in many cases they might have decided contrary to the way in which
they actually did without their decisions ceasing to be, or to make, the law?
Indeed, the arguments against Gray's position involve a confusion between
formally possible and actual law. By giving the judge authority to make
law there will always be law, but only after the judge decides. This clearly
does not mean that actual legal decisions are so completely determined by
previous law that the judge is a mere phonograph or automaton without
opinions or sympathies of his own (based on his limited experience) that
determine how he shall decide.
The insufficiency of the actual or existing law to determine completely
all the issues that come up has been hidden by the use of certain maxims or
principles as self-evident axioms. It is hard to see how we can avoid relying
on such maxims if we are to start and get somewhere. Yet, on examination,
they turn out to be largely illusory. Consider, for instance, the seemingly
self-evident principle that no one can acquire a right by committing a wrong.
Yet one who obtains property by theft does acquire the right of possession
against everyone except the owner, and even against the latter after a certain
lapse of time. We think it self-evident that no government has a right to
take the property of Peter and give it to Paul. That, we say, would not only
be robbery but also a treacherous betrayal of trust, since government is instituted for the protection of property as well as life, etc. And yet we do, in
fact, take property from Peter, in the form of taxation, and give it to Paul
in the form of a pension or the education of his children or general public
protection against typhoid; and few really think that this is unjust, although
Peter may be a bachelor on principle and immune to typhoid. Our courts
also speak as if legislatures cannot delegate their legislative powers, yet that
is altogether unavoidable whenever laws have to be interpreted and applied
in the course of administration.
The appeal to self-evident principles is part of traditional philosophy
and especially of the Scotch intuitionism which has influenced legal thought
in this country to a much larger extent than is generally realized. This intui7.
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tionism attempted to settle controversies by appeal to maxims as self-evident.
It assumed that we know a priori, independently of all experience, that the
axioms of Euclidean geometry are absolutely true in the physical world, just
as according to Kant and the Romantic philosophers, we also know the a
prioriabsoluteness of the law of gravitation, the laws of Newtonian mechanics, and the laws of other physical phenomena. In the same way it has been
supposed that we know absolute rules or principles of law. But the fact that
the people who agree on these principles draw different consequences from
them shows that their agreement is merely verbal, that they use the same
verbal form to denote different things.
The misleading appearance of definiteness in maxims may be seen historically when we remember that the framers of the Declaration of Independence with its ringing note about all men being created free and equal had no
objection to slavery and that those who objected to the principle of taxation
without representation continued to oppose granting the suffrage to those
having less than a certain amount of property or to women who had property.
Many good people today still repeat the latter principle, though they are violently opposed to allowing resident foreigners, illiterates and others the right
to representation, even when the latter are taxed very heavily.
Courts frequently express indignation against class legislation and
declare it unconstitutional as not offering to all the "equal protection of law."
But the fact is that nearly all legislation is class legislation. Any law that
begins with the statement, "Whoever does so and so," for example, steals
something over the value of five shillings, obviously creates a penalty for a
certain class of individuals, and protection for others. So do laws which
recognize differences between men and women, between infants and adults,
and the like. I suppose that those who object to class legislation object to
unjust privilege. They do not wish to see certain classes of people receive
advantages or disadvantages because of their position or status rather than
because of what they do. But the actual effect of legislation always does
advantage certain people more than others. It is unavoidable. I suppose
that we shall all agree that a law debarring red-headed men from practising
law would be a discrimination not relevant to any socially desirable end.
But in actual cases where statutes have been declared unconstitutional as
class legislation the legislature did see a very real connection between the
distress of a given class and the remedy needed in that particular situation,
while the courts have relied on verbal abstractions without any realization of
the actual facts necessary to determine the concrete meaning of such
abstractions.
Early American judges who thought it beyond the power of the legislature to take the property of A and give it to B also said it would be monstrous for a legislature to be able to declare the wife of A to be no longer his
wife. But that is exactly what divorce laws do. I do not wish to argue the
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merits of divorce laws. I am merely calling attention to the fact that what
horrifies people when abstractly stated may not horrify them in actual cases.
Maxims are social coin and have a social value and vogue apart from their
concrete meaning. But from the point of view of logic or semantics, it is an
error to think of the meaning of a legal proposition as something completely
independent of its consequences. The analysis of the facts in a situation is
not only necessary in order to know what law is applicable, but the process
of application develops the very meaning of our legal propositions.
If the foregoing embodies any truth we cannot pretend that the United
States Supreme Court is simply a court of law. Actually, the issues before
it generally depend on the determination of all sorts of facts, their consequences, and the values we attach to these consequences. These are questions
of economics, politics, and social policy which legal training cannot solve
unless law includes all social knowledge.
Consider Marshall's argument for the power of the courts to declare
acts of Congress unconstitutional.8 The argument starts from the clause
that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and assuming it is selfevident that the Court is the sole interpreter of the law, concludes that the
Court alone can decide what is constitutional. That this argument is not
altogether as rigorous as it sounds may be seen from the fact that the Court
has refused to decide what the Constitution means by a "republican form of
government." It said in effect: "That is for Congress and the Executive
to determine." Some things in the Constitution, then, though law, may be
interpreted by Congress rather than by the courts. Indeed, Marshall's argument from the fact that the judges swear to obey the Constitution might well
be turned against him with the query, Do not the President and the members
of Congress also swear to act in accordance with the Constitution?
The pretence that every decision of the Supreme Court follows logically
from the Constitution must, therefore, be characterized as a superstition.
No rational argument can prove that when the people adopted the Constitution they actually intended all the fine distinctions which the courts have
introduced into its interpretation. Nor can we well deny the fact that judges
have actually differed in their interpretations, that Taney's was not that of
Marshall, and that Brandeis' views are different from those of McReynolds.
A sense of humor, if not of courtesy, would prevent a majority of the court
from applying the term unreasonable to those interpretations of the Constitution by legislature and executive which seem reasonable to a minority of
the court.
Nihilistic Absolutism
The foregoing and other abuses of logic in the law are in line with similar
abuses in other fields which have been characterized as "vicious intellectual8. Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch 136 (U. S. i8o3).
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ism." A reaction against this has naturally been provoked and has taken
diverse forms. There has been the appeal to intuition, to common sense, to
justice, to history, to the empirical facts of human behavior, or to the supposed facts of our sub-conscious or unconscious thought. It is interesting
to find some of these facts drawn from the mushroom science of psychoanalysis and other sources that will hardly stand up under any scientific or
legal rules of evidence. All of these forms of anti-intellectualism, however,
concern us here only to the extent that they lead to a nihilistic absolutism
according to which there can be no logical certainty in the law at all. In
the main this has been supported by the nominalistic dogma that there can
be no law other than the actual individual judicial decisions, which have
physiologic causes such as the state of digestion, etc., but no logical determinants. I cannot here examine in detail the metaphysical assumptions of
this dogmatic nihilism, which no one has ever carried out consistently because
it is practically impossible to carry out any universal denial of the existence
of universals.
I may, however, call attention to some obvious difficulties in such absolute denials. We select judges from those who have studied law and we
expect them to obey it. How are we to discriminate between proper decisions and judicial tyranny or even corruption, if there are no rules at all
to tell us whether the judge has acted within the law? Again, it is well to
say that the judge is or should be guided by the facts in the case and not by
a prioriprinciples. But what does that mean? What facts we are to regard
as relevant in a given case depend upon certain general conceptions or principles of connection. When we say a certain issue is to be settled empirically, that it depends upon the facts, it is always relevant to ask, In what
way does it depend? If we cannot answer the last question, the problem of
effective administration of the law has certainly not been solved.
The logical positivists or nihilists at times contend that they are not
responsible for the popular expectation of justice or of certainty from the
courts; and I am not arguing that any contention is untrue because it would
be inconvenient if that were the case. It is, however, relevant to note that
these realists do not believe in the consequences of their theory. They do
not, and cannot, think that it would make no difference whether the judge
did or did not know any law. Nor would they, I suppose, contend that
everything that a judge says or does is law. If, however, certain acts of the
judge are beyond his judicial power the determination of the latter is itself
dependent on a legal rule determining his proper scope.
In any case, the historical fact is that the stream of judicial decisions
has a continuity, and judges in deciding actual cases are to some extent
influenced by the logical demands set by the prevailing conception of what
the law is or ought to be. The law is not in fact a completed, but a growing
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and self-correcting system. It grows not of itself but by the interaction
between social usage and the work of legislatures, courts, and administrative
officials and even legal text writers. In this growth the ideas which people
have of what the law is and how it ought to grow are not without influence,
though obviously inadequate for complete control of all future decisions.
The logical error of absolutism is the same in the revolutionary as in the
conservative camp--the love of undue simplicity. Metaphysically this shows
itself in the assumption of absolute linearity of determination between universals and particulars, principles and actual decisions. But from universals
alone we can not determine particulars, and the latter obviously cannot completely determine the former.
In the historic process, there is no absolute beginning. When we come
to reflect we find ourselves in medias res. We try to extract from past
decisions rules to guide the future ones, and we test the appropriateness of
these rules by the consequences to which they lead. As these consequences
are evaluated differently by different people, such a process cannot rule out all
differences of opinion based on differences of experience or temperament,
but if consistently carried on it promotes greater order and understanding.
For dialectic or purely formal purposes, as in mathematical or logical
considerations, we cannot dispense with absolute accuracy. When, however,
we come to descriptions of nature, or prescriptions for human conduct, we
cannot attain such absolute precision and we have to expect imperfection,
though we must hold the ideal of perfection with sufficient tenacity to
realize that our actual achievement has fallen short of it. This recognition
of the necessity of the ideal and our inability throughout time to achieve
perfection, is the condition of intellectual and moral sanity. It enables us to
evaluate some concepts as more definite than others. The concept of disorderly conduct, for instance, is not as definite as that of usury or illegal
rate of interest. The progress of the law involves the attainment of greater
definiteness as well as greater flexibility. The problem of reconciling these
two demands is difficult and we can seldom attain perfect satisfaction. But
we have to learn to live in our imperfect world. -We should not, in the language of Tourtoulon, throw to the dogs all that is not fit for the altar of
the gods. 9
The foregoing criticism of logical absolutism in the law holds equally
well of its ethical content. But before considering the latter it is well to
glance briefly at the conflict between those who view the law as an ideal
system and those who view it as completely in the field of natural existence.
9.
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II.

THE REAL AND THE IDEAL IN THE LAW

The law of any country is imperative in that it orders people to do or
refrain from doing certain things. Obvious as this may seem it has been
vehemently denied by many influential jurists on diverse grounds. One
such denial takes the form of the assertion that the law is only a system of
hypothetical judgments as to what will follow in certain situations. This
seems a typical instance of a purely verbal issue. If I have the power to
evict you from my house what real difference does it make whether I order
you out directly or tell my servant that he will see you to the door? Yet
it is a mistake to ignore the importance of verbal differences in the law as
in theology or in other vital social affairs. For different phrases have,
because of their associations, different emotional tone and do not therefore
equally fit the diverse temperaments which enter into social issues. Thus
auihoritarians naturally prefer the imperative terminology which is very
distasteful to those who like to think that their work is scientific and that
science deals only with facts of existence.
Be that as it may, the sharpest issue on the question of legal method or
the nature of the legal system is that between those who view the law as
a natural phenomenon, and those to whom it is an eternal ideal to which
external human conduct ought to conform. The latter view is most emphatically expressed by Kant, 10 according to whom the law tells us not what
empirically exists but what is categorically imperative on all societies at all
times. Instances of such imperatives are the property right of the first
12
occupier," and the duty to execute a murderer.
We cannot here discuss the metaphysical foundations of this dualism;
but from a juristic point of view it has encountered difficulties which it has
not been able to overcome. None of its specific imperatives have been able
to maintain their absoluteness. The right of the first occupier has become
highly questionable in a society where it has relatively little application; and
the whole lex talionis has been attacked as for the most part impossible of
application and too brutal in those few cases where it can be applied. The
main objection to all these imperatives is that as specific directions they are
altogether arbitrary, that they take norms which happen and prevail among
certain peoples at certain stages and set them up as valid everywhere for
all times. Kant assumed that the conscience of all rational beings demands
them. But this, like all arguments based on the authority of intuition or of
unanimous consent breaks down the moment you challenge it.
In reaction against this kind of absolutism, positivistic jurists insist that
only if we restrict ourselves to the realm of factual or historic existence can
io. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY oF LAv (Hastie's ed. 1887) 82 et seq.
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our inquiry be called scientific. Therefore a science of the law must study
only what is and have nothing to do with what ought to be. This leads to a
difficulty which positivists generally pass over, namely the fact that the law
does not declare or describe what exists, but rather commands or prescribes
what should be done. The existence of a law of natural science can be
refuted when we can show that a single phenomenon fails to conform to it,
but a law in the juristic sense does not lose its claim or validity when any
one acts in ways contrary to it. For the validity of such a law is a logical
inference from certain recognized legal principles and as such does not
depend upon people drawing it always, or in a majority of cases. If the Volstead Act 13 forbids the sale of alcoholic liquors, actual sales will not abrogate
it. Whether it is law or not depends logically on whether it does or does
not follow from the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Two efforts have recently been made to face this. One is by the younger
American jurists who follow Holmes' dictum 14 that the law is merely the
set of predictions as to what the courts will decide. Looking at the law
externally, this statement is unexceptionable, at least in the context in which
that great jurist stated it. The dictum, however, does not say anything
about the law in the process of making, i. e., how legal problems appear in
the course of argument before a court or in the deliberations of a judge when
he has to decide. For obviously the problem of the court is not to predict
what it will do but how the case should be decided. This is also the problem
of the systematic jurist or the critic of any particular decision. Any decision
may be criticized on the ground that it is not consistent with the principles
generally recognized or embodied in specific statutes or in repeated previous
decisions that have created habitual expectations in the community. It
would be disastrous for the progress of the law, therefore, if the dictum in
question coupled with another misleading dictum,' 5 that experience and not
logic is the life of the law, were to lead to the neglect of the requirements
of consistency in the law. It must be insisted that courts must not only
decide individual cases, but must develop the legal system in such a way
that people may generally know their rights and duties, what they may or
may not do in recurrent situations.
As a system the law is developed through logical and technical methods
of interpretation and analysis, whereby recurrent and relevant elements are
recognized in the cases before us, and the decision made to fit as far as
possible the reasonable expectations of those who have considered the law
and the given case. It is not necessary to assert that this is what actually
happens in every decision. It is sufficient for our present purpose to main13. 41 STAT. 305 (1919), 27 U. S. C. A. § i et seq. (1927).
14. Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897) io HARV. L. REv. 457-8.
15. HOLMES, THE CommoN LAW (1881) i.
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tain that the actual law is not a pure chaos but is more or less systematic
and hence that the ideal of logical system is an actual operative demand or
imperative in the process of lawmaking by courts, jurists, and to some extent
even by legislators.
A more elaborate attempt to deal with the normative element in the law
is that of Kelsen, 16 who maintains a sharp distinction betweeen existing social
facts and what is logically demanded by the postulates of legal system. By
isolating this element of validity from all questions of existence, Kelsen
eliminates all descriptive sociology from his pure jurisprudence. To do this
he has also to eliminate all human beings, the sovereign legislators, judges,
administrators and legal subjects. No one can make law or administer it
except one who is legally authorized to do so. State officials then have no
existence as officials except as creations of the law. The whole sovereign
state thus disappears and becomes merely a system of legal obligations.
Kelsen likens this disappearance of the state from jurisprudence to the
disappearance of the soul or consciousness from psychology. But Kelsen
not only eliminates the soul but also the individual subjects. Like Cassirer
and other Neo-Kantians he wishes to have a world of function without substance-a grin without a cat. We cannot, according to Kelsen, speak of
the citizen obeying or disobeying the law. For the latter contains not orders
to the individual citizen but only declarations to its officials as to what
consequences follow certain acts. The law is thus not a command by any
natural person or group to other human beings, but only a self-contained
system of propositions.
No one who has followed Kelsen's work can help admiring his keen
ingenuity and resourcefulness. He has undoubtedly done good service
in piercing the shallow pretensions of positivistic sociologists who think that
from a premise that is merely descriptive of what people do we can logically
deduce what they should do. But his pure jurisprudence would be an altogether homeless ghost if he did not insist that all law must be positive, i. e.,
actually prevail in an existing society. Here he involves himself in fundamental inconsistencies. Consider the case of official groups like the United
States Congress, the Supreme Court, or ordinary juries that fail to carry
out a specific legal provision. From his purely logical point of view, Kelsen
must assert that the law is not changed when it is in fact disregarded or disobeyed by its officials. Yet, as a positivist, he cannot assert the existence
of any law that does not prevail or is not applied in definite time and place.
His admission that a revolution (which is a social phenomenon) may change
the legal system shows the impossibility of eliminating all reference to
existence from even the most abstract theory of what can significantly be
called law.
i6. KEsEx, ALGxrNE STAATSLHRE
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From these and similar difficulties we can escape if we get rid of the
nominalistic prejudice in favor of atomic facts, and recognize that in the
world of reality existence and the relations which constitute its logical implications are inseparable. The law as a system is an ideal. And as an ideal
it denotes not a number of existing decisions but something by which actual
legal decisions can be determined and criticized. But it is also an historic
reality in the sense that it is a logical determinant of the existing law, so
that we can speak of the legal system of a given country, e. g., of Sweden,
and compare it with the legal system of another country or with that of the
same country at another time. Legal system is a form or pattern which
helps us to analyze, understand, and judge the official conduct of administrators, judges, and lawyers and the acts of others who are influenced by such
conduct.
The foregoing considerations enable us to avoid not only the absolute
dualism between an eternal ideal and a changing phenomenal order but to
avoid also the Hegelian absolutism which ignores the distinction and brutally
identifies the ideal with the actual. 1 Hegel does this not only by identifying
the actual (Prussian) State with the absolute but by trying to reduce history
to a purely logical process. Now it is doubtless true that the categories
of logic are applicable to the historic process-history would be meaningless
without them. But the material evidence on which we must construct our
view of history is fragmentary and contains too many irrelevancies to justify
absolute conclusions. Our best efforts can give us results which are only
probable. We must therefore conclude that while existence and validity
cannot be absolutely separated they cannot be absolutely identified. They
are, like the two sides of a window pane, inseparable though never identical.
While logical relations are not, as such, events in time, our ideas of what
ought to be can and do exercise effective influence. But we must remember
that our ideals of what ought to be do not have corresponding objects as do
our true ideas of what exists. Also the relation between acts and ideals
by which they are to be judged is different from that between a physical
event and its generalization. The same physical event may be governed
by quite different legal norms. A box of shoes, for instance, leaves one
place and arrives at my house. The physical path thus taken may be determinate; but whether I shall be obliged to pay for them or not is not thereby
determined, but depends on legal norms or principles.
One may thus view the task of the law as the setting up of norms to
govern the world of actuality. But these norms themselves are historically
conditioned. They depend upon considerations as to what happens most
17. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (Wallace's Trans. 1894) i47-i59; PHILOSOPHY OF
HISTORY (Sibree's Trans. 1894) 9-20, 475-477; PrIOsoPHy OF RIGHT (Dyde's Trans. i896)
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frequently under similar conditions and upon estimates as to the probable
effects of certain regulations. In this sense we may say that the law selects
certain norms or patterns of conduct and tries to repress extreme variations
from them. It may be argued that in doing this we are continuing on the
higher or conscious level the biologic process of natural selection. But without involving ourselves in the difficulties of the concept of natural selection
when applied to social policies, we can certainly insist that law develops
through conscious activity determined by reasons or ideals as to that which
ought to be.
In this connection we may well take note of the classical controversy
as to whether the law rests on reason or on force. It is interesting to note
that the former view was pressed with the greatest vigor by the most typical
English lawyer, typical, in his practical distrust of system and rational
theory. I mean, of course Lord Coke. In an argument with King Jameswe have only Lord Coke's own report 1.-he urged that law was nothing
but reason. When the King asked, "Have I not reason too ?" Coke replied
with the dodge that law is not natural but artificial reason acquired by studying the law of England. The reply to this was made by that great, though perhaps untypical, English philosopher, Hobbes, who observed that what Coke
decided was law not because he had more reason than anyone else but because
the King made him judge.19 Now, who is King or has the power to appoint
judges and enforce their decisions is not purely a matter of reason but
involves an element of force. Force is an element in all government or legal
systems. It may take subtle forms. The rulers may govern in the name of
God, the Constitution, the will of the people, or the interests of the proletariat. But ultimately they must be able to exert some kind of physical compulsion. At any rate, that is what they do in modern states. Hobbes put it
brutally when he said that in the law, if nothing else turns up, clubs are
trumps.2 0

This is of course very crude, for, as has often been remarked,

you can do everything with bayonets except sit on them, and government
must have a seat of authority. For the most important element in the
efficient enforcement of governmental orders is that people should have
the habit of obedience. This habit can be acquired by other means than
bayonets. Consider, for instance, the way in which people obey priests,
doctors, or their own young children, or the way in which an audience obeys
the directions of a speaker or magician to look to one side of the room, to
raise their hands, and the like. These psychologic influences of suggestion, of arousing awe or respect or psychologic fear, if not love, cannot be
ignored in communal organization. Still, in the end some element of brute
I8. Prohibitionsdel Roy,
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force is necessary to regulate a complex system of social relations and to
remove recalcitrant obstruction.
The vice of absolutism to be eliminated here as before is the undue
simplification of the issue. The anarchists say that law rests upon force
and they trace all obedience to it. They admit that the policemen, the
sheriffs and the militia are relatively few. But to the question how these
few can control the vast majority, they answer that through superior organization and arms the ruling class can prevent effective opposition. Now it
cannot be denied that a great deal of obedience to the law is brought about
through sheer fear, so that when the police are away, as happened during
the police strike in Boston in 192o, the number of thefts and robberies increases. Moreover, conventional moral prohibitions are notoriously weaker
when the temptation to deprive another of what is morally his due can be
satisfied without legal hindrances. That is the very reason why some laws
are created. Nevertheless, it is obviously not true that the state rests on the
policeman's club or soldier's bayonet. The proof of that can be seen in
the fact that if a vote were taken today in any of our states as to whether
the police force should be completely abolished or not, the number who
would vote for abolition would probably be negligible, despite the cry for
relief from the burden of taxation. The maintenance of police and militia
then rests upon the will of the great majority in point of fact. The majority
may resent many of the laws as monstrously unjust, and they may tolerate
others for no other reason than because they do not know how to get rid
of them. And yet the whole system of laws with the necessary machinery
of enforcement is felt to be a necessity. And if by some accident it disappeared overnight, it would very soon be restored. This does not mean
that any system of laws is as good as any other. But it does mean that
we generally obey the law not only from fear of punishment for its violation
but because we prefer to live under a system involving some compulsion.
There are many reasons for this preference. We may note in passing that
men and women prefer to obey in most cases rather than take the trouble
of thinking. We may see the situation concretely in the case of traffic laws.
Do traffic laws rest on the force of the police or on the will of the people?
The anarchistic theory says that either such laws are not necessary or that
they do not have to be enforced because it is obviously for the interest of
everyone to have them and to obey them. Yet the fact is that without the
police force, traffic rules, no matter how reasonable, would not be always
obeyed by the very people who urged their enactment.
The truth, then, is that only the love of absolutism or undue simplicity
prevents us from seeing that the actual facts fit into neither theory. Men
do want the traffic laws and also want to disobey them. They are rational
at certain times and realize that the demand for safety and ease of communi-
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cation demands these rules be enforced and they vote taxes for such enforcement. Yet, they will occasionally be tempted to violate these laws. A realistic view of human nature need not hesitate to admit this irrationality of
human nature against which we take some precautions in our rational
moments. We all know that we are subject to certain temptations and if we
are wise, we take care to arrange our lives so as to minimize the possibilities
of such temptation.
III. ETHICAL ABSOLUTISM IN THE LAW
The relation between law and ethics cannot be adequately described either
by identifying them or by saying that they are completely independent.
There are obviously legal rules that are contrary to the general feeling of
right and wrong in a community and yet are undoubtedly part of the law.
If that were not the case, there could be no such thing as an unjust law and
no protest against injustice by prophets or reformers who represent the
conscience of the community. An unjust law does not cease to be a law
because it is unjust, although it ought to cease to be a law. On the other
hand, there are many rules of morality which find no support in the law.
Only confusion, therefore, results from identifying the two and then on
other occasions treating them as independent. This unfortunately is what
we find in the decisions of our highest courts. On some occasions we are
told: this is a court of law and not of social ethics. But at other times
judges argue: this cannot be the law, for it would be unjust, etc.
Since the prevailing traditional view regards morality as consisting
of authoritative and absolute rules, theories which conceive the law as part
of morality thus share in the absolutistic tradition. This may be seen
most clearly in its extreme form, to wit, in the Kantian view of law as a
branch of Sittlichkeit, or social ethics. just as "thou shalt not kill" is a
categorical imperative to the individual, "thou shalt kill the murderer"
is a categorical imperative to every organized community. Even if a
society is to be dissolved, the last murderer in jail must be executed.
The view that punishment is a matter merely of preventing crime or
reforming the criminal is thus consistently characterized as an immoral
evasion of the duty to punish. Similarly, does Schopenhauer condemn all
21
equity which would soften the absolute rigor of the law.
In our own country the morally absolutistic view of the law is embodied in the orthodox theory of our bills of rights and of the nature of
our common law which, as has been frequently pointed out, rests on the
classical theory of natural rights. The law is a body of principles laid
down by nature or the author of nature. It has been revealed in the free
21.
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institutions of the Anglo-Saxons since they inhabited the German forests
(if not in the classical Roman law to which Grotius and others appealed).
These principles are often referred to as the unwritten law, the unwritten
constitution, or the law behind the law, revealed in the conscience of mankind. Only judges on the bench, however, can pronounce its specific legal
consequences.
In its classical form, the theory finds few defenders today among
those who call themselves political scientists, and there is an almost universal condemnation of it among our progressive thinkers. Indeed, the
emphasis of legal scholarship since the French Revolution has been predominantly on the historical note, on the fact that the law changes and
that therefore there cannot be any one set of rules valid for all times and
for all societies.
This criticism, however, is obviously too sweeping and overreaches
itself. Granted that law, like every phase of human life, changes with
time, it does not follow that such changes are devoid of historical continuity. We do not lose our individual identity because we grow older
and sometimes sadder and wiser. Looking at the matter quite empirically, we should say that no matter how far back we trace legal systems,
we find human nature and social organization presenting certain common
patterns so that the law of family life today closely resembles in many
respects the law of the Romans, Greeks, Hebrews and Egyptians, just as
the fundamental relations between husband and wife, parents and children
are still the same. There are variations doubtless between ancient and
modern conditions. But there are also variations of family life in the
United States today and it is by no means certain that the latter variations
are less than the former. Nor is the rather superficial criticism of the
historical school against the doctrine of natural rights conclusive when
we look at the law as a body of prescriptions regulating our social life.
Some of the rules of hygiene laid down by Hippocrates are still applicable
today. Why not some legal rules? The adherents of the modernistic
school insist upon historical relativity. There is no ideal best government, they say, valid for all societies. What is the best government depends upon local and historic circumstances. Quite so. But is it not
necessary to ask: How and upon what circumstances does the ideal depend? Some people say that that government is best which works best.
But what is to be the criterion as to what does work best or better than
another?
The term "natural law" has been identified by Dean Pound and
others with the idealized law of the time and place. Now, our ideal is,
as we pointed out before, always conditioned by the circumstances under
which we live. But let us note that natural law is often also an idealization
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of the opposite to that which prevails. Where inequality or privilege
exists, natural law demands its abolition.
Pound does not sympathize with the lawyer who, opposing the reception in this country of the English common law against strikes, argued
that it is contrary to the rights of man and that considerations of this
kind are more important than an historical inquiry as to the usages of
ancient Romans, Britons, etc. Now, I confess at once that my sympathies
are with the lawyer who argued thus. It is easier to analyze our present
conditions and judge how for good or ill they are affected by certain rules
than to find out what were the ancient social conditions that called for
or tolerated an old law. Theoretically, however, the dilemma does not
present mutually exclusive alternatives. The social value of modem rules
against strikes may conceivably be illumined by historical considerations,
and the understanding of ancient rules may be aided by a clear idea as to
the fundamental values that the law aims to serve or ought to.
This critical attitude to the usual objections against the classical
doctrine of natural rights does not of course dispose of the case, but it
calls attention to the need of a closer examination of the issue.
The beginning of wisdom seems to me here as heretofore to keep in
mind the distinction between that which is true generally or for the most
part (which can be evidenced only by history) and that which necessarily
holds always and everywhere without qualifications (which requires logical proof). Thus, the rule against lying may be viewed as a maxim to
be generally observed because experience shows it to be requisite for that
mutual trust without which many social relations are impossible or not
worth while. Kant, however, in the retirement of his study definitely
asserts it as an absolute rule: we may not tell a lie under any circumstances, not even to save a human life. This has appeared to many as the
reductio ad absurdum of moral absolutism. Kant himself weakens his
absolutism when he comes to apply it to the legal field. For he allows
some exceptions to the duty to execute the murderer, and this opens the
door to the doubt as to whether the number of exceptions might not be
increased. Of course every proposition becomes absolute (i. e., in no
need of further qualifications) if it states all the conditions which will
make it true. But in matters of fact, and especially in human relations,
absolutely complete knowledge is unattainable. In the simpler issues of
medicine, for instance, we can tell only what prevails generally, not what
is absolutely true in every case. Much less are we in the position to
determine the more complicated question as to what is ethically required
in every concrete case. The law indeed does not attempt that. Recognizing the imperfection of its tools, it cannot hope to attain absolute
justice. It serves its human purpose if it minimizes the amount of injus-
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tice in the community. Probably few if any laws fail to effect some injustice in special cases, but we are satisfied if on the average, they seem to
do more good than harm. Thoughtful people do not expect absolute
perfection from human effort. But we must faithfully and persistently
keep the ideal before us, not only to incite even greater effort, but to keep
us from falling into the deadening idolatry of the actual. Unfortunately
most of the servitors of the law cannot escape the general human tendency
to exalt their occupation and thus to set up the law as the object of
supreme or absolute respect. Such respect may be useful in our routine
or customary life. The law, however, is not the end of life but a means
to facilitate the process of living; and it is folly to devote all of our
attention to instruments. Certainly the law cannot be the supreme principle if we believe that it may be changed by the will of the people to make
it more in harmony with their vital needs.
Legalism, the belief in the supremacy of law, cannot recognize the right
of revolution. If the constitution is regarded as law, then a people can have
no legal right to change it except in the way in which the constitution itself
provides, no matter how onerous such a process may be. The logical consequence of this would have been to prevent the people of Rhode Island from
ever changing their constitution or charter which contained no provision for
amendment. Yet, the moral right of the people to make such a revolution
is the very basis of our legal system. For the establishment of the United
States Constitution was itself a revolution, i. e., an illegal setting up of a:
new form of government. Indeed, it was legally more revolutionary than
the Declaration of Independence. For in the latter the colonists claimed that
the King of England had forfeited his sovereignty by committing illegal acts.
But in setting up the United States Constitution as binding if three-quarters
of the states accepted it-thus completely ignoring the Articles of Confederation which prescribed unanimous consent-no pretense of legality was
alleged except the tacitly assumed right of the people to set up a new plan of
government whenever they deemed it conducive to their general welfare.
An interesting manifestation of this absolutistic legalism is the view
that the people of the United States can never amend the Constitution to
deprive a state (without its consent) of its equal representation in the Senate.
Never, never, no matter what conditions may arise, can unpopulated Nevada
be deprived without its consent of the right of having as much representation
in the United States Senate as states that have more than IOO times its population-a situation which in England before 1832 was called the "rotten
borough system." But this idea that we can forever bind all future generations is an illusion which meets with the bitter mockery of history.
A distinction may well be urged between the right of the people to
change their legal system, and their right to pass laws which are inherently
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or intrinsically unjust. This would be a purely academic issue if it were not
for our prevailing assumption that our judges are the only ones qualified to
tell what is due process or justice in any given social situation. I do not wish
at this point to challenge a proposition which is generally discussed in an
a priori fashion but which requires for its verification an appeal to actual
instances. How many times have the people of the United States actually
been saved by the judiciary from injustice at the hands of the legislature and
executive? And how often have judicial interventions themselves produced
injustice?
As history cannot prove any absolute rule, let us then briefly face the
question as to what is justice in the law, and whether its dictates are absolutely certain as is so often assumed.
Since the dawn of history the bitter cry for justice has filled the human
scene. But though in every discussion of any social question, all parties
appeal to it, we rarely come across systematic attempts to answer the question,
What is justice? And even in specific issues, for example, what is a just
wage, a just price, a just claim to national independence, we find few attempts
to clarify the fundamental principles assumed. Different parties all claim
justice on their side. It has been said that the Romans never made war
without making certain that justice was on their side. This did not prevent
them from conquering all their neighbors. Nor did it prevent others from
denouncing the Romans as unjust oppressors.
This diversity of views as to justice has bred a certain despair, that there
is no such thing as justice and that the word conveys only diverse emotional
opinions. But such a negative attitude is so contrary to the currents of practical life that the reaction to it intensifies the authoritarian view. The latter
often takes the form of a claim to know by an immediate super-rational
intuition or revelation what is absolutely right. Is there any way of avoiding
this dilemma between the absolutism of denial and that of brute affirmation?
I suggest that there is.
Suppose that we start with admitting that questions of justice are largely
matters of opinion. Does it follow that all opinions are equally bad? Do
not some opinions have a little more evidence in their favor than others?
And is it not the quest of science to find evidence to enable us to choose the
best available opinion? That is certainly not a view that can be rejected by
those who believe that we can talk about sociology and psychology as sciences.
The notion that science starts with absolute facts cannot receive serious
attention from those familiar with the actual procedure and history of the
most advanced physical sciences. We always start with vague perceptions
and hypotheses or guesses, and progress consists largely of critical analysis
of our hypotheses, deductions from them, and a constant checking of their
consequences by appeal to perception (and a correction of our perception by
theoretical considerations). Now it may be objected that ethical judgments,
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or judgments as to what ought to be, cannot by their very nature be tested
by any appeal to objective facts of existence or perception. That, however,
is only partly true. In its nearsighted view of what constitutes existence
this objection ignores the rational element in things which makes science possible. It is a radical error-indeed an established superstitution-to suppose
that science is concerned only with brute facts of existence. That would rule
out pure mathematics from the realm of science. The fact is that knowledge
of nature or physics becomes in a significant sense scientific only when it
embodies mathematical elements in the form of deduction from principles
or hypotheses, and these mathematical or logical elements denote relations of
order of all objects. Now just as physical science may be viewed as an effort
to organize our judgments of nature into a coherent or rational system, so
ethics may be viewed as an effort to organize our moral judgments of what
ought to be into a rational system. For just as we may be mistaken as to
the actual physical constitution of things we may also be mistaken as to what
ends we really think worthy of achievement. This shows itself tragically in
the bitter disappointments which we often feel when we achieve what we
thought worthy of effort. I do not therefore wish to minimize the difficulty
in the formulation of a theory of justice in the law. To apply it in actual
cases clearly presupposes all our knowledge of nature and man in his social
relations. Nevertheless, it is a task which is as unavoidable as it is of vital
importance. And those social scientists who think that they can avoid it by
restricting their view to what actually exists have repeatedly been shown by
history to be guilty of crypto-idealism, i. e., of setting up the existing forces
or their own view as that which ought to prevail. Clearly, therefore, we may
start with theories or opinions as to what is just, and by submitting them to
the critical tests of logic or scientific method discriminate between their more
and their less tenable elements. In this way we may not attain absolute truth,
but we can make progress at least in the clarification of our ideas.
Let us begin with the simplest conception of justice involved in the
popular view of a just price, or a just wage. If we examine this closely, we
find that the just thus designates the expected, the usual, or the customary
and that, indeed, is in effect the answer of scholastic common sense. Now,
it is easy enough to see the inadequacy of mere custom. For there are not
only unjust customs, such as slavery and exploitation, but in a heterogeneous
society or in one that is changing, what is just for one group at one time is
not just at another time. Still, it is a mistake to leave out the element of
custom from the constitution of justice, as so many modern writers are
inclined to do. This shows itself in the inability of moral philosophers to
appreciate the importance of prescription. Why should anyone who has
acquired property unjustly, get a good title after twenty or thirty years?
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The answer is that usage develops expectations and that the shock to general
expectations is itself an evil.
Similarly, justice cannot be satisfactorily identified with any one abstract
principle like equality, liberty, or the like. What is equal protection to
employer and employee, for the powerful American Tobacco Company and
the small storekeeper? We need not repeat the burning irony of Anatole
France: "The law in its majesty draws no distinction but forbids rich and
poor alike from begging in the streets or from sleeping in the public parks."
Equality is meaningless under unequal conditions. And yet we do resent
certain discriminations against us. Few of us, I imagine, really care to serve
on juries or to hold public office. And yet, if a law were passed to disqualify
us because of our race, religion or philosophic occupation, we should naturally
resent the discrimination.
A similar analysis applies to the view that justice consists essentially in
respecting human liberty or freedom. The word liberty has become a symbol
around which have clung some of the most generous human emotions. We
have been brought up to thrill with admiration at the men who say, Give me
liberty or give me death. But the philosopher asks whether all those who
are devoted to liberty mean the same thing. Does liberty, or freedom, for
instance, involve free trade? Does it involve freedom to preach race hatred
or the overthrow of all that we regard as sacred? Many who believe in
liberty characterize the freedom which they are not willing to grant, as
license, and they do it so often that one may be inclined to think that what we
really need is less liberty and more license. Moreover, there is a confusion
between the absence of legal restraints and the presence of real freedom as
positive power to do what we want. The legal freedom to earn a million dollars is not worth a cent to one who has no real opportunity. It is fashionable
to assert that men want freedom above all other things but a strong case may
be made out for the direct contrary. Absolute freedom is just what people
do hot want; and to follow some leader, master, or mistress, or some cause
that demands unqualified submission, is a deepfelt need. Orthodox Judaism,
Islam, the Catholic Church, and Calvinism are not the only illustrations of
the extent to which men feel liberated when they submit without question or
qualification to authority. Consider the agonies of those in doubt as to the
precise rules of etiquette. How relieved they feel when some good book or
newspaper columnist tells them what to wear, how to order certain foods in
public places and other conventionally accepted ways of doing things. The
need for authority is the need for relief from the great burden of being in a
state of freedom and having to think and to decide. It is much easier for
most of us to let someone else take the responsibility and do the thinklng,
and deciding for us.
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But when all this is said, we all grow indignant and feel hurt to our very
bones when the brutal dictatorship of a Mussolini or a Hitler deprives men
of their right to express their views freely. Freedom, especially in its negative sense as the absence of restraint, will certainly not exhaust the content
of what we mean by justice. But it is certainly an indispensable element in it.
An attempt to solve the problem of justice that seems to include all the
elements is that of Plato, whose view might be summed up as saying that
justice is the health of the body politic. Just as a body is healthy when every
organ functions properly, i. e., to the degree that it re~nforces rather than
hinders the functioning of all the other organs, so a state or an act is just
when it ministers to the general harmony of all social functions. A healthy
heart is one that will supply enough blood to all the organs of the body, but
not too much. So, a just social claim is one the satisfaction of which will
make for the reinforcement of the various activities which constitute communal life. This is in harmony with the Hellenic ideal of everything according to measure.
Despite the fact that this view has been before mankind for over twentythree centuries and has stimulated many minds throughout the ages, it has
not proved altogether satisfactory. The criticisms of it are familiar but I
shall refer to only two points: (i) the assumption of the commensurability
of all social values, and (2) the optimistic assumption that we can attain the
wisdom which will enable us by law to prevent injustice.
(i) It seems quite obvious that actual social conflicts cannot be readily
settled by the Platonic formula. What, for instance, would be a just solution
of the problem between Ireland and England or between the Ruthenians of
Eastern Galicia and Poland? On one hand we have the principle of selfdetermination. Every group, we say, is entitled to express its own genius
in language, religion, and political institutions. On the other hand, the need
of common security, of preventing artificial economic barriers, is also essential, if men are to have real opportunities for free development. It is easy
to say, let us have a free federation of independent groups. The real difficulty
in the way of this is the difficulty of determining how much economic advantage should outweigh national pride. Indeed, the commensurability of human
values is a will o' the wisp, so long as we have no ideas of a common unit
wherewith to measure them all.
The problem of weighing or evaluating interests appears unduly simple
in the utilitarian maxim of the greatest good to the greatest number. This
assumes (a) that every individual is to count for one, and (b) that it is
always possible to compare and measure different human goods. Both of
these assumptions may well be questioned.
(a) That in a just legal system the interests of any one individual
count for no more than the similar interests of any other individual is apt
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to appear as an eternal self-evident truth to those who accept the democratic
faith. But critical reflection must note that in moral relations individuals
and communities are not fungible but highly individualized. We may subscribe to the equalitarian doctrine when it is abstractly formulated. But few
of us really accept the view that the welfare of four hundred million Chinese
ought to outweigh the similar interests of one hundred and twenty-five
million Americans. Nor can the obligation of providing employment for
twenty thousand people in Arkansas take precedence over the task of providing employment for a few members of our own family in Maine. Differences
of time also enter. While we recognize our obligations to the generations
following us and feel that we ought not to impoverish the country which we
are to leave to them, we do not feel that remotely future generations have the
same claim on us as have our contemporaries, our children and immediate
successors. We sometimes justify this on the ground that we do not know
what the situation will be in the remote future and cannot therefore make
provision for it. And there is doubtless some truth in this. We can look
after the interests of others only when we can imaginatively put ourselves
in their place. That is why we are generally more ready to help an individual
stranger when we see him injured than to contribute to a general hospital
fund. The fact remains, however, that in general we do not feel as much
moral obligation to those who are remote from us in time or social grouping
as we do to those with whom we can identify ourselves in some common
interests. Nor can I see how it can possibly be proved that we ought not to
feel that way. We cannot appeal to moral principles unless their obligatory
character can be felt.
These doubts do not of course do away completely with the principle
that where all other considerations are equal the interests of the larger number ought to prevail. Unequal distribution of wealth is generally felt to be
unjust. But note that only when formulated dialectically or hypothetically
can our principle be said to have absolute claims. In actual situations no
one interest can be isolated and it is always doubtful whether in fact all other
interests are similar.
(b) Those who talk freely of measuring human interests seldom examine critically the implications of the process of measurement and the conditions under which it is feasible. The modern analysis of what is involved
in the addition of magnitudes shows that it is meaningless to speak of complete measurement unless we can (a) identify a standard unit capable of
indefinite repetition, (03) define some operation by which we can determine
that two magnitudes are equal, and (7') define some operation which will give
meaning to the sum of two or more magnitudes. These conditions have been
met neither by the old hedonists who talked glibly about a hedonistic calculus
-as if there were any inherent meaning in saying that one pleasure is three
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times as great as another-nor by the recent social scientists who identify
measurement with certain crude statistical procedures.
It may be urged that while these conditions for the measurement of
extensive magnitudes are not easily met in the realm of social interests, we
can and do measure pleasures as intensive quantities, by the simple test of
preference. Now it may be true that the more we know about people the
more we can predict their preferences, and this is even more true of groups
of people. But the fact remains that human preferences are proverbially
inconsistent or highly variable in time, varying according to incalculable subjective factors. When will people revolt? When they are driven to it by
intolerance and oppression, say some. But others with plenty of historic
instances at their command, urge that oppression degrades people and robs
them of the will to assert human rights. Human preferences do not seem to
be the resultants of a few simple causes, but rather of a large number, no one
of which can be isolated on a large scale and measured under experimental
conditions. Where we deal with fungible goods as in the realm of economics,
we can measure the intensity of demand. But how much or how strong a
desire for economic gain will outweigh taboos against forbidden food, working on the Sabbath, making graven images, and the like? We are inclined
to expect more coherence in human purposes than is actually there, because
in our intellectual craving for simplicity we attribute to human life some one
all-controlling purpose, such as self-preservation or the like. But this is seen
to be illusion when we remember our many preferences which lead to dissolution and death.
We need not disparage the work that has recently been done on the
measurement of emotion and social attitudes. So far as it rests on psychophysical tests, it seems in the realm of verifiability. But when we go on
to the social implications of these measurements we are not on such
firm ground. Most studies of this sort are statistical, generally based
on the answers given to questionnaires by various selected groups such as
children in the movies, students in the classroom, and the like. These
groups are selected because they can be readily induced to take the trouble
to supply such answers. But one can well doubt whether these replies represent any characteristic that will repeat itself with any constancy. Nor is
there much evidence that the replies of other people would be the same as
that of our selected group, no matter how much care we have exercised to
choose at random. There will always be characteristics of our group which
we do not have in mind, e. g., the particular neighborhood, social class, temporary fashion, or response to some special condition of the experiment; and
our inability to eliminate the fallacy of selection vitiates all our statistical
generalizations.
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Justice Cardozo has suggested a rather simple hierarchy of social values,
to wit: moral, economic and aesthetic, which the law should protect in
the order named. 2 2 Does this mean that no amount of economic interest
can outweigh a moral duty? That would logically follow from the absolutistic conception of morality. No community, however, no matter how
enlightened, ever takes that position. Thus there can be no higher moral
obligation for a community than to prevent whenever possible the killing
of human beings. Yet, measures for the protection of life can not be free
from economic scrutiny, and certain costs will always be regarded as prohibitive. It may not be amiss to note in passing that those philosophers
who hold that respect for human personality is absolute and the very basis
of ethics, have not generally condemned wars in which countless human
beings are destroyed to defend the economic interests of their country.
It may of course be argued that moral duties are not on a par with
economic interests but are rather the supreme principles which determine
which of a number of conflicting social interests shall in any given case
prevail. But this does not solve the difficulty of how much of economic
value may be disregarded in protecting specific moral standards of family
life, of public conduct, etc. The very idea of attaching a money value to
these interests is shocking and yet the duty to husband our economic resources cannot be ignored. There are limits to the economic expense which
we are willing to incur to improve the administration of justice, but we are
far from having arrived at any principle to enable us to do it rationally.
And since in practical life we dispose of such issues by questionable resolutions we leave dissenters entirely unconvinced.
Similarly, we may well question whether economic interests should prevail over aesthetic ones, and many today condemn the extent to which our
American courts have carried this doctrine. Recent thought has come to
realize that the traditional Anglo-American view dictated by our business
men is based on a very superficial conception of life and social needs. Aesthetic needs are basic and grow out of our fundamental instincts which are
often of greater vital urge than ordinary economic ones. Certainly a major
part of humanity thinks cosmetics and beautiful clothes worthy of economic
sacrifice, even at the expense of adequate food. If we were to accept categorically the superiority of the economic over the aesthetic, we should allow
the progressive uglification of our roads as well as city streets and the subordination of the scenic beauty of Niagara to the interests of electric power.
But that is hardly a self-evident requirement of justice.
For years I have followed with close interest and great hope the movement of Interessenjurisprudenz in France, Germany, and in this country,
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and I regret not to be able to see as yet any substantial progress toward the
solution of the problem of determining with some degree of definiteness
the relative weights which different social interests should have in the legal
system. Still the effort at some kind of systematic evaluation of these interests is inescapable. The possibility of intelligent choice depends on it. Possibly we shall in the course of time be able to elaborate better technics of
measurement than seems feasible to us today. But it is well to realize the
difficulties in our way even when we must strain our utmost to overcome
them.
(2) The second objection to the Platonic theory of justice is that it is
too optimistic in its conception of the capacity of law to bring about the
proper social order. Throughout history there have been those who regard
it as absurd to attempt to make people better by law. The law, they say, is
essentially an iniquitous thing, something which is the outgrowth of fraud
and violence. The monks of the fourth century felt that way when they
assumed that the union between the Christian religion and the Roman state
would disappoint the hope of the world by corrupting the church. The law,
they said, is the crucifixion of that ideal which frees man in his inner soul.
In modem times this view of the law as necessarily a restraint or bondage
permeates our revolutionary as well as our conservative ideology. Consider, for instance, the philosophy of Karl Marx. Most people think of
Marx as a socialist and naturally suppose him to be in favor of an organized
state and, therefore, some legal system. But if you read him carefully, you
find that he agrees with the anarchists that the state is essentially evil. A
state or legal order is simply the enslavement of one class by another. In his
challenging book on PoliticalParties,23 Robert Michels points out that governments are inevitably oligarchic because government is a special function;
and those in charge of it naturally develop special capacities and interest and
put these interests first. Thus every government regards the attempt to
overthrow it as the most serious of all crimes. Communist Russia in this
respect follows the example of the Czarist government. Ordinary murder
is a matter of eight or ten years at hard labor, but an attempt to overthrow
the government is a capital offense. That is characteristic of most governments. The point that Michels makes, then, is that so long as you have
government, you will always have a group that has special interests, and they
will necessarily think of their special interests as more important than all
others. Therefore, law will always be basically unjust, and you cannot hope
to make it just so long as it is administered by human beings.
To some extent, the philosophy which existed in this country in the
eighteenth and for the most part in the nineteenth century, was based upon
23. MiCaELS, POLITrICAL PARTIES (915)
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this anarchistic conception of law and justice. John Marshall, in his life of
Washington, says in effect that the mere fact "that power might be abused
was a conclusive argument against its being bestowed." 24 Therefore, they
instituted a government of limited powers, so that the abuses would be
limited. This is a sentiment which Mr. Shaw described some time ago when
he said that the United States Constitution was based upon the anarchistic
theory that the best government is that which does not function. 2 5 I submit
that this is very largely true, historically. It was the view of Jeffersonian
and Jacksonian democrats who fought against the rule by the squirearchy
of the Eastern border. These backwoods farmers were discriminated
against in respect of legislative representation. People living far from
the seat of government in a sparsely settled land cannot expect much from
government regulation. The less government, the less oppression. This
philosophy of an agricultural country has been used by the great manufacturing and financial interests to oppose social legislation and it has thus remained
our national philosophy. Thus when a law is declared unconstitutional most
people feel that no harm has happened. There is a popular view that so
long as Congress is in session and is enacting laws, the people have reason
to be afraid, and when Congress is adjourned, people can rejoice. That view
was frequently expressed by our representative national philosopher, Mr.
Will Rogers. I am not here discussing the merits of this view. I merely
wish to indicate the large r6le it has played in our history. Though it originated as a revolutionary philosophy, it has become an argument of those who
wish to defend their interests against the popular will expressed in legislation.
Against this pessimistic view of the inevitable injustice of man-made
law we may urge the same objection as that against other forms of absolutism or undue simplicity. In actual life the fact that different classes have
conflicting interests does not prevent their also having interests in common.
Even the most unjust ruler may have an identity of interest with those he
rules. Santayana has put this in the form of a parable which I sometimes
take the liberty to repeat in a slightly modified form.28 Imagine a wolf
cunning enough to realize that, as the supply of sheep may become rather
uncertain, he had better become a shepherd. He guards the flock, leads them
to green pastures, and sees to it that they multiply so that he has an abundant
supply. His interest as a ruler, while antagonistic, is also intertwined and
for many purposes identical with that of the ruled. And that is more or less
true under nearly all forms of government. There always are differences
between the interest of the ruler and the ruled but also identities.
24. 2 MARSHALL, LIFE OF WASHINGTON (2d ed.
25. N. Y. Times, April 12, 1933, at 14.
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Now it may well be urged that actual wolves have no wisdom, do not
turn shepherds, and that many governors, say in Burma or imperial Rome,
were no better. Still, human history shows that no government can last very
long if it does not render the people some service. When governments become intolerable men cease to obey or the governor is overthrown. The actual
state of society, therefore, is in fact never one of mere conflict or pure
opposition but a combination of both war and peace. In time of crisis we
are apt to forget the common basis of human life, the touch of nature that
makes all men kin. We fight without compromise and without doubts,
and if anyone suggests that the other side might have some rights that we
ought at least to investigate, we regard him as an enemy or perhaps a paid
agent of the other side. Under such conditions, you cannot have what is
called enlightened selfishness, or reason, but only an appeal to arms, and
an appeal to arms is a return to an uncivil state of nature in which every
man is against the other. Such struggles may remove some evil, but it is
always destructive; and sooner or later men get tired of war, and then they
make treaties of peace. Now I submit that you can view ordinary legislation as treaties of peace between the warring interests of the community.
In point of fact, if you watch actual legislation, whether in Harrisburg or
Albany or Springfield, what you see is that there are various interests represented in the legislature, say the railroad interests, the employers or the employees, the farmers, or their wives in the W. C. T. U. and others. Each of
the various groups is constantly pressing its claims. Others are opposing
those claims, and what actually happens is just what happens at any peace
treaty. The strongest may get the lion's share, but if the strongest group
could get everything through its own power it would have no need of any
treaty. The victor makes a treaty of peace only because it is not worth while
for him to exterminate the defeated party, i. e., the defeated party still has
some fight or resistance left, and it is deemed more economical to make
some concessions rather than endure the trouble of fighting to wipe out the
will of the defeated party. And that is what happens in legislation. We
can view the law as a series of treaties of peace, which will be just only
to the extent that the various interests are genuinely represented.
Whether our political system does or does not give genuine representation to all is a question of political analysis into which I cannot go, but
I wish to note the fact that merely geographic representation does not guarantee actual representation of the different elements of our population. I
would like also, in passing, to protest against the popular confusion between
representative and elective government. The knight of the shire, who was
forcibly taken by the sheriff to Westminster to vote upon the question of
taxes for the king, was not elected by his shire, but he surely was a representative of the other knights to the extent that when he voted taxes, he
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represented the interests of all those knights who were similarly circumstanced. He voted for the interests of the knights as far as he could. In
that way he was a representative, though he was not elected. On the other
hand, men may be elected who are not at all representative. Therefore, if
you have in mind the general improvement of the law, you must also have
in mind the ways in which the various interests of a community can receive
adequate representation.
A naturalistic view of justice as the adjustment or harmony of our
interests seems to many people too materialistic. Men like Carlyle call it
"pig-and-swill" morality. Justice, they say, is something divinely superior.
Even thoroughgoing naturalists may admit an element of truth in the last
contention, in the sense that there are enormously great differences between
various interests and that in the pursuit of more immediate material interests
we are in danger of sacrificing higher, i. e., more subtle and more inclusive
ones. But the maxim flat justitia pereat mundus shows the bankruptcy of
the absolutistic conception of justice. Kant indeed defends it on the ground
that a world that is unjust is not worth preserving. 2 7 But we may well
turn this around and say that a justice that would destroy the world is surely
not worth having. It would certainly not serve as a basis for any relatively
permanent legal system. To kill the patient in order to follow the rules of
hygiene is no more absurd than to ruin a society for the sake of observing
a supposed rule of justice. Even the divinely ordained Sabbath was made
for man, not man for the Sabbath.
The law is an ancient institution. As is true of other human arrangements, there are people who regard it as divine. They speak of the law as
if it all emanated from Sinai. But while there may be some law that
emanated from Sinai, surely not all the legislation that we have today, nor
all judicial decisions. On the other hand, it is equally absurd to regard
all law as essentially iniquitous. Let us recognize that while pure white light
and absolute darkness are abstract elements of the human scene the actual
colors of life are mixtures. The problem of justice is that of cleansing
the social order of its black spots. This is an endless as well as a difficult
task because all we do is constantly befouled by our inevitable errors and
folly. But life would be unbearable without the effort at purification.
We must also remember that whatever our ideal of substantial justice,
it is obviously incomplete unless it includes the ways of bringing it about.
A duty that is not executory or would be a duty only under non-existent conditions is hardly a possible ideal for the legal system. Now the process of
realization must start with the actual, and it depends for its success on the
extent to which we utilize the actual physical and social forces, human nature
27. KANT, op. cit. supranote

Io at 196.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

and its environment. Furthermore, there can be no just order unless there
is also what I have called "formal" justice, i. e., a general determination on
the part of those who deal with the law to live up to its spirit, to carry out
not only its literal provisions but the ideal inherent in it. Doubtless, the law
will never, so long as it is administered by human beings, be free from arbitrary will and brute force. Nevertheless, it cannot function in an organized
society without some rational effort at justice as an ideal harmony.
In my attempt to steer a safe course between the Scylla and Charybdis
of opposing absolutisms, I am not likely to have escaped serious error and
may not even have made my main points tolerably clear. This is not altogether avoidable. If we distinguish clarity from mere familiarity, we can (as
Peirce 28 indicated) make our ideas clear only by working out their consequences and that is a task beyond the scope of the present occasion. Our
discussion, like most recent discussion in this field, has been critical and programmatic, rather than dogmatic and constructive. Yet I venture to assert
that the road I have suggested is bound to prevail precisely because it is not
original or novel but expresses the essence of logical or scientific method at
the basis of all rational procedure. I am reluctant to use the term scientific in
this connection. It has become a fetish to many who prate about it without
any more real sympathy than familiarity with the rigorous self-restraint
which it imposes. But if scientific method means conscientious accuracy and
adequate evidence for one's assertion, some of the modernistic tendencies in
jurisprudence and contemporary social science have as long a way to go as
some old-fashioned legal doctrines. The former are doubtless naturally provoked by the bland complacency with which the leaders of the American bar
keep on repeating questionable propositions as if no one had ever questioned
their self-evidence, very much as bad pedagogues try to dispose of questions
which they cannot answer by repeating their dogmas in louder authoritative
tones. But we shall not get rid of vicious absolutisms by sweeping, unguarded, and unqualified denials. The swing of the pendulum is not the way
of progress. The way of understanding and wisdom requires the more
difficult task of just discrimination, which is inordinately difficult because it
involves a check to our intellectual as well as emotional 6lan vital. True
intellectual vitality, however, shows itself not in letting one's self go or in
romantic dreams which come in periods of fatigue, but in that self-critical
effort necessary to master our material.
It is well, therefore, before concluding, not only to recognize the natural
inevitability of the craving for the absolute, but to pay tribute to its necessary
function in maintaining intellectual and moral sanity. It is well to be on
guard against the hardly avoidable tendency to regard our impressions as
definitive truths that do not require the endless process of qualification. But
28. PEiRcF CrANcF, LoVE AND Loaic (1923)
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although this craving for undue simplicity is a fatal snare, it is folly to try
to banish absolute or rigorous logic. While all the material truths which we
can achieve at any one time are necessarily incomplete or subject to the
qualifications of future knowledge, our procedure must be formally rigorous.
The direction and goal of our efforts must be relatively fixed if there is to be
any significant race. The absolute denial of all constancy or identity in the
world of change and variety would make all assertions meaningless. Those
who delude themselves with the naive faith of finding refuge in "the facts"
are the victims of an uncritical metaphysics which assumes that each fact of
existence is complete in itself and independent of every other. In truth, however, there is always a nexus which makes things pass beyond themselves, so
that when you begin with one fact and wish to explore its nature you find
yourself very soon beyond your starting point dealing with abstract conditions and ideal possibilities. In any case we cannot maintain sound intellectual procedure by turning our backs on critical logic; we cannot attain clear
ideas as to the nature of the factual or real world by ignoring that obstinate
effort to think clearly which is the core of metaphysics; and we cannot arrive
at a clear idea of what it is that we really wish to achieve without the clarified
vision of the summum bonum which is the subject matter of critical ethics.
It is doubtless possible to do good work in limited fields without the conscious
pursuit of these studies in their traditional forms. It is even certain that
traditional errors in these fields have caused most deplorable confusions. Yet
in the end, sound methods and adequate ideas are not attained by wilfully
shutting our eyes; and those who have thought that they had succeeded in
this by banishing logic, metaphysics and ethics from their view of the law
have merely imported them in an uncritical and unavowed form.
If reason is viewed in itself as bare logic or necessary order, it seems
not only colorless and devoid of warmth but also chilling to our heart's desire.
Yet, on reflection we must recognize that just as the healing art is based on
a dispassionate study of physiology and pathology, so is rational organization
the necessary condition of our attaining our heart's desire. Philosophy cannot by itself solve the specific problems of law and public life. That requires
favorable circumstances and more empirical knowledge than the philosopher
generally has at his disposal. But by our very endeavor to rise above the
struggle of the market place and to cultivate a wider vision, we can soften
the rigors of fanatical conflicts and thus help in a measure to bring about
that peace based on understanding which is the essence of liberal civilization.
Rational reflection is itself a natural expression of human energy without
which human life would be brutish and devoid of outlook and genuine inspiration. It is only when law is thus seen as part of the life of reason that the
ideal of just law can become a real force for genuine beneficence.

